The war in Ukraine, in its third year, should come to an end. European nations welcome a resolution to the war which ensures peace and democracy for the Ukrainian people without further bloodshed. Wars end either through military victory or negotiation. To understand the conflict’s dynamics, it’s worth examining Ukrainian supporters, often framed as a comparison between U.S. and European contributions. The Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker (also available on Statista) provides a detailed breakdown of military, financial, and humanitarian aid shows the respective contributions
By Strand Consult, Denmark
Building on prior studies and the European Commission’s second 5G Toolbox report (2023), Strand Consult identifies a notable correlation between reliance on Chinese telecom equipment, reluctance to implement the 5G Toolbox, and minimal military support for Ukraine, among certain countries. Despite all European Union (EU) nations committing to the toolbox, implementation lags, particularly in larger economies, raising security concerns. The analysis explores links between proximity to Russia and military aid to Ukraine, showing that nations located close to Ukraine tend to provide more support. This analysis highlights broader geopolitical and security challenges within the EU.
Critics argue that the Kiel Institute’s figures exclude countries’ contributions to the European Peace Facility (EPF), which funds military aid to Ukraine, citing potential double-counting since the EPF reimburses nations for donations from their reserves (previously at 90%, now 43%). Meanwhile, the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) reports that in the third year of the invasion, Europe imports of Russian fossil fuels (€21.9 billion) exceeded the financial aid sent to Ukraine (€18.7 billion), highlighting Europe’s continued energy reliance on Russia.
Strand Consult has covered the global mobile telecom industry for 28 years. Many inquire about the implications of a second Trump administration, particularly on Ukraine, geopolitics, and the global. The U.S. stance remains difficult to predict, and regional vulnerabilities vary.
The share of Chinese equipment in Europe’s mobile telecom networks
Since 2019, Strand Consult has made mapped nations’ dependency on Chinese equipment. The mapping of Europe includes 102 mobile networks in 31 European countries, noting the evolution from 4G to 5G infrastructure and subsequently the 10 countries of the EU’s Enlargement Package. Strand Consult’s latest study (December 2024) «The Market for 5G RAN in 2024: Share of Chinese and Non-Chinese Vendors in Europe» provides valuable information for policymakers, though some mobile operators are displeased that their purchases have been made so transparent.
Strand Consult has also examined the EU’s 5G toolbox and the implementation across the 27 member states. The purpose of the EU 5G toolbox is to reduce risk as described in the research note «Eight risks for the 5G supply chain from suppliers under the influence of adversarial countries like China»
Implementation of EU´s 5G Toolbox
In June 2023, the European Commission published the second 5G Toolbox report showing the progress of EU countries on implementing the EU’s 5G toolbox. EU member states have had more than 5 years to implement the toolbox, and regrettably the progress is slow with certain significant members.
Strand Consult´s new 2025 study shows that four countries have not implemented the toolbox: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Hungary. Six countries have limited implementation: Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Finland and France. Seven countries have significant implementation: Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, Spain, Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia. Then countries have completed the implementation: Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Luxemburg, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
The categories for further focus include the 6 countries of partial implementation and the 4 countries of no implementation. Note that all 27 EU member states pledged to implement the EU’s 5G toolbox.
The correlation between European nations’ level of Chinese telecom equipment, Russian energy, and military aid to Ukraine
Strand Consult’s research has consistently shown over 6 years that nations which purchase most Chinese telecom equipment lag on their implementation of the EU 5G toolbox. Strand Consult now inquires whether and to what degree an EU member nation’s policy preference could be observed in other areas, for example the consumption of Russian energy and military aid to Ukraine. The preliminary results suggest a correlation between the use of Chinese equipment, the unwillingness to implement the EU’s 5G toolbox, and reluctance to support Ukraine with military aid. On the other hand, there does not appear to be a connection between consumption of Chinese equipment and Russian, with the exception of Hungary.
Indeed there appears a strong correlation among that the countries which acquire most Chinese telecom equipment, downplay implementation of the EU 5G toolbox, and reluctance to support Ukraine with military aid. Here are the results for the relevant countries:
• Austria: 67% of Austria’s 5G infrastructure comes from China. Austria has given 0 euros in military support to Ukraine in 3 years. In 2024, Austria spent €1.60 billion on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.34% of Austria’s GDP. Austria has provided 0% of Austria’s GDP in military aid.
• Bulgaria: 65% of Bulgaria’s 5G infrastructure comes from China. In 3 years, Bulgaria has provided 0.24 billion euros in military support to Ukraine. In 2024, Bulgaria spent €0.70 billion on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.74% of Bulgaria’s GDP. Bulgaria has provided 0.088% of Bulgaria’s GDP in military aid.
• Hungary: 62% of Hungary’s 5G infrastructure comes from China. Hungary has given 0 euros in military support to Ukraine in 3 years. In 2024, Hungary spent €4.10 billion on Russian energy, equivalent to 2.09% of Hungary’s GDP. Hungary has provided 0% of Hungary’s GDP in military aid.
• Ireland: 36% of Ireland’s 5G infrastructure comes from China. In 3 years, Ireland has given 0.18 billion euros in military support to Ukraine. Ireland has not reported spending on Russian energy in 2024. Ireland has provided 0.012% of Ireland’s GDP in military aid.
• Italy: 35% of Italy’s 5G infrastructure comes from China. In 3 years, Italy has given 1.37 billion euros in military support to Ukraine. In 2024, Italy spent €2.30 billion on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.11% of Italy’s GDP. Italy has provided 0.022% of Italy’s GDP in military aid.
• Spain: 32% of Spain’s 5G infrastructure comes from China. In 3 years, Spain has given 0.79 billion euros in military support to Ukraine. In 2024, Spain spent €2.60 billion on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.17% of Spain’s GDP. Spain has provided 0.018% of Spain’s GDP in military aid.
• France: 13% of France’s 5G infrastructure comes from China. In 3 years, France has given 3.50 billion euros in military support to Ukraine. In 2024, France spent €3.50 billion on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.12% of France’s GDP. France has provided 0.043% of France’s GDP in military aid.
These 10 nations provide sharp contrast to Denmark, a country with 5.7 million people which uses no telecom equipment from China. In 3 years, Denmark has given 7.54 billion euros in military support to Ukraine. In 2024, Denmark spent 0.02 billion euros on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.05% of Denmark’s GDP. Denmark has provided 0.67% of Denmark’s GDP in military support. This means that Denmark has provided 1.88 billion euros more in military aid to Ukraine over the past three years than France (3.50 billion euros), Spain (0.79 billion euros) and Italy (1.37 billion euros) combined.
The correlation between the distance to the western Russian border and military support to Ukraine
One inquiry shows the distance from the respective European capital to the nearest Russian border and the propensity to support Ukraine with military aid. The numbers suggest that the closer a country is to Russia, the more likely it is that it will support to Ukraine with military aid. The table below provides the details.
This policy preference could be explained by the history that these nations were either part of the old Soviet Union (today’s Baltic States) or were part of the Warsaw Pact, the alliance between the Soviet Union and a set of Eastern European nations. It could suggest that nations which earlier were subject to Soviet control are reluctant to see a return of Russian aggression on a neighbor, hence they support Ukraine and reject the purchase of Russian energy.
The correlation between the purchase of Russian energy and Chinese telecom equipment
Given China’s support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with equipment, North Korean soldiers, and other support, Strand Consult made a preliminary investigation to European nation’s preferences for the purchase of Russian energy and Chinese telecom equipment. No correlation could be established. It appears that energy consumption reflects a different set of factors including the existing set of energy sources, infrastructure, and historical consumption patterns.
Though 11 years have elapsed since Russia invaded Crimea, many European countries have not reduced their dependence on Russian energy, even though they make political pronouncements against the invasions.
Significant countries that deserve special attention
The 27 member states of the EU are dissimilar in their geography, population, and policy preferences. Certain countries deserve more explanation because they have significant geography and/or population. These nations are France, Germany, Hungary, and Austria.
France:
The French President considers himself a de facto EU leader and critic of the war on Ukraine, however Franch consumption of Russian liquid natural gas (LNG) grew by 46% in 2024 over the prior year. Moreover, French military aid to Ukraine is limited considering that France has the largest military industry in the Europe Union. Indeed French President Emmanuel Macron urged European nations to buy French, not American, weapons, French military support for Ukraine pales in comparison to that of Denmark, a significantly smaller nation in population and geography in mainland Europe.
In 2020, the French semiconductor manufacturer STMicroelectronics partnered with Huawei in an apparent attempt to circumvent US restrictions. In 2022, France made a huge investment of into the STMicroelectronics.
The French government is also the shareholder of the satellite company Eutelsat. Few know that for the past three years, Eutelsat Group has facilitated the distribution of Russian state-controlled media to Russia’s NTV Plus and Trikolor, reaching approximately 15 million households in Russia and occupied Ukrainian territories. Despite European Union sanctions imposed in December 2022 against certain Russian media companies, Eutelsat Group has yet to take action to restrict these channels. As a result, the French satellite operator continues to transmit the Russian Armed Forces’ Zvezda channel and the Russian Orthodox Church’s SPAS channel to audiences in Russia and annexed regions of Ukraine. In Eutelsat’s 2023 financial statements note that Russian business accounts for 6% of revenue. The 2024 report does not disclose the figure of revenue from Russia.
Companies in Russia face a stark choice on support for Ukraine: Exit Russia like Michelin, Louis Vuitton, Citroën and Chanel. Or stay like Eutelsat and aid Putin’s disinformation campaign. Check out the Denis Diderot Committee for more information.
Germany
There should be no doubt that Germany is China’s best friend in Europe. In Berlin, China’s best friend, the soon former Federal Minister of Transport and Digital Affairs Volker Wissing, he went to China to communicate that EU import tariffs on Chinese cars would not be enforced. Then he signed he a memorandum of understanding with the director of China’s Cyberspace Administration Zhuang Rongwen on the «dialogue on cross-border data traffic.»
Subsequently, Wissing and the soon departing German government leaders made policy to enable Chinese suppliers Huawei and ZTE in German networks to 2030 and possibly beyond, putting Germany at odds with the rest of the EU nations, the US, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, and other democratic nations which promote policy to secure networks from Chinese intrusion. Germany’s decision reflects the cooperation of the German government and operators, whose parameters for the amount of equipment and install period exceed what all security experts recommend. The policy endangers the safety and security of some 85 million Germans and given the size of the country, the largest economy and most populous nation, puts the rest of Europe at risk.
Huawei supplies German railroads (Deutsche Bahn). This means that there is a risk that China could shut down the German railways given a geopolitical conflict. German railways are the bedrock distribution system of heavy industry in Europe.
Huawei also provides the cloud solution that Deutsche Telekom delivers to private companies and authorities in Germany. In practical terms, many Germans’ data is stored in a Chinese cloud.
While 60% of Deutsche Telekom’s market cap comes from T-Mobile USA, DT has done the most to keep Huawei in the European telecom infrastructure. DT succeeds to convince authorities by buying the lie that Huawei networks can be made secure by implementing a new RAN management solution. It’s like saying that a Windows PC could be made «safe» by switching the software update solution to a non-Windows solution.
Hungary
Hungary’s leadership, openly favoring Russia over the EU, relies heavily on Chinese 5G infrastructure (62%) and spent €4.10 billion (2.09% of GDP) on Russian energy in 2024, while offering zero military aid to Ukraine in three years. Though Hungary’s actions draw justified EU criticism, other EU nations also provide minimal or no military support to Ukraine, yet escape similar scrutiny.
Austria
Austria is bound to neutrality by the 1955 Austrian State Treaty and its constitution, which prohibits entry into military alliances and the establishment of foreign military bases on Austrian territory. This could explain why Austria does not provide military aid to Ukraine. However, this does not explain Austria’s enthusiasm for Russian energy. Even three years after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia provided 95% of Austria’s gas. Austria’s second biggest bank remains embedded with Russia despite EU and US ultimatums to derisk. Today 67% of Austria’s 5G infrastructure comes from China. In 2024, Austria spent €1.60 billion on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.34% of Austria’s GDP. Austria is one out of 4 countries which declines to implement EU´s 5G-Toolbox.
Conclusion
Europeans contemplate the future of the partnership with the United States. Many Europeans, while smarting from recent events but do not recognize that some European nations have failed their promises to the US to spend more on defense. For instance, Denmark, after promising in 2019 to invest €2 billion in Arctic defense, only acted in 2025 following pressure over Greenland to honor those earlier pledges. Indeed, the European pledge to spend more on NATO dates from 2014; the shortfall is more than a decade in the making.
The increasing consumption in some EU nations of Chinese telecom equipment and Russian energy exacerbates security risks and runs counter to shared goals. Regrettably, significant nations in Europe have spent more in consumption of Russian energy than aid to Ukraine. Conversely, smaller nations near Russia, with Cold War experience, have offered significant aid and adopted the 5G Toolbox, except for Hungary.
The «rip and replace» of Chinese telecom equipment is often misunderstood. No EU country has fully removed it; instead, telecom operators halt new investments and gradually phase out existing equipment during technology upgrades. Strand Consult’s study measures 5G risk exposure by assessing the installed base of Chinese equipment. This measure provides an exposure risk indicator for end users and nations, a more accurate method than tracking vendor sales trends. This installed base method highlights actual user and national security risks. Phase-out timelines, typically 3-7 years, prolongs this exposure, especially in large markets like Germany, where Huawei retains a strong foothold due to slower, China-friendly policies.
Above, photo by Katie Godowski on Pexels
